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The First Use of Poison Gas
at Ypres, 1915
A Translation from the
German Official History1

Introduced and edited by
Mark Osborne Humphries and John Maker
Translated by Wilhelm J. Kiesselbach

W

hile English-speaking historians know in
detail about almost every event on the BEF’s
front, the same cannot be said of our knowledge
of the German side of the Western Front. This
is not surprising, as comparatively few English
language books have been written about the
German experience on the battlefields of the
Great War. Recent English language scholarship
by Holger Herwig, Annika Mombauer, and
Robert Foley,2 to name but a few historians,3
has enriched our understanding of the conflict.
However, these works have tended to concentrate
on political and diplomatic history, or in the
case of Mombaurer and Foley, on high-ranking
officers such as Helmuth von Moltke and
Erich von Falkenhayn. This means that events
at the tactical and operational level remain
comparatively unexplored in English. This gap
in the historiography has largely been shaped by
the absence of primary source materials.
The major impediment to study of the
German army was the destruction of the military
archive at Potsdam during Allied air raids on
14 February and 14 April 1945.4 These raids
destroyed virtually all the war diaries, field
dispatches, orders and memoranda that made
up the primary records that historians use to
This article is excerpted from the forthcoming publication
Germany’s Western Front: Translations from the German
Official History of the Great War, edited by Mark Osborne
Humphries and John Maker, a four-volume series in seven
parts due to be published beginning in 2008.

reconstruct a battle.5 Although the destruction of
the archive was not total,6 the materials that did
survive – or that have resurfaced following the
end of the Cold War7 – represent only a fraction
of the documents that exist on Allied operations,
for example, in London or Ottawa. While recent
historians have used these limited archival
resources with great effect, a large history of
Germany’s Great War was actually published
before the destruction of the majority of the
archival record.
On 1 October 1919, as the institutions of
Wilhelmine Prussia–Germany were being swept
away, a new organization headed up by Hermann
Mertz von Quirnheim was created to oversee the
German archival holdings: the Reichsarchiv.8
Military history in Germany had always been
the purview of the Great General Staff, but with
the abolition of that Prussian institution, the
task of writing a comprehensive military history
of the Great War was assigned to a special
subsection of this new organization under the
direction of Hans von Haeften.9 Although the
Reichsarchiv and its Historical Section were
officially civilian institutions, they were staffed
by former members of the Great General Staff
including Hans von Seeckt, Wilhelm Groener,
and Hans von Haeften, and the military was thus
able surreptitiously to maintain its control of
military history in Germany.10 On 1 November
1931, von Haeften became the president of the
57
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Reichsarchiv and Wolfgang Foerster assumed the
directorship of the Historical Section.11 Between
1919 and 1 April 1934, when the Historical
Section was removed from the umbrella of the
Reichsarchiv and placed under the purview of
the Reichswehrministerium (Military Ministry),
the organization produced the first nine volumes
of the main series12 and several ancillary texts.
On 1 April 1937, the Historical Section became
the Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des
Heeres (KGFH) and was reintegrated into the
German General Staff system until the project
was completed in 1944. 13 On 1 April 1936,
the military records of the Reichsarchiv were
also transferred to a new ‘Heeresarchiv’ (Army
Archive) at Potsdam, which was administered
by the KGFH, and it was here that they were
destroyed at the end of the Second World War.14
By 1945, however, the series had been completed
and totalled over 9,300 pages accompanied by
more than 430 maps and sketches.15
D e r We l t k r e i g , 1 9 1 4 b i s 1 9 1 8 i s a
comprehensive, narrative overview of the Great
War, based on a documentary record that no
longer exists. Moreover, it contains lengthy
excerpts (sometimes three or four pages) from the
destroyed official documents. Published between
1925 and 1944, the volumes of Der Weltkrieg
are remarkable, not only because they are one of
the only surviving sources of information on the
day-to-day operations of the German Army as a
whole, but also because they provide insight into
how the Great War was understood and portrayed
by an official, government organization during
both the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich.16
At times the history is apologetic, as when it
explains the reasoning behind the first large-scale
gas attack of the war, but is also remarkably frank
as when it discusses German war aims on the
Eastern Front. In fact, it is comparable in many
ways to Edmonds’ British Official History, which
has likewise had its critics.
By their very nature, official histories of
any kind are notoriously problematic. Like any
work they are the product of a particular time
and place in history. Unlike most historians,
however, an “official” historian must satisfy
both the demands of the sponsor organization
as well as its members, if only for the simple
reason that the co-operation of both parties is
required to complete the work.17 The official
historian also has the added burden of being

part of the organization about which they are
writing which can place the interests of historical
objectivity in competition with loyalty, friendships
and patriotism.18 Like the Canadian, British
and Australian official historians, Reichsarchiv
historians had to walk a difficult line between
pleasing many of the officers with whom they
had served in the Great War, while at the same
time creating a work that was acceptable to both
contemporary historians and the governments
which funded the project.19
Contemporary English-speaking historians
were generally receptive to Der Weltkreig. In a
1931 review of all the official histories published
to date, Alexander Johnson wrote of Der
Weltkrieg:
The military historians, who remain anonymous,
deserve great credit for their splendid work.
They present their story in simple, readable
language that will sustain the interest of the
lay reader and with a degree of fact-finding
objectivity which commends itself to the military
reader and student.20

More recently, some historians have looked far
less favorably on the German Official History,
citing alleged Nazi influence, the German
Fraktur typeface or an archaic use of language
as reasons for ignoring the 14-volume series.21
Hew Strachan, however, points out that Der
Weltkrieg is an invaluable resource, when read
in its proper context:
…the availability, since the end of the Cold War,
of the working papers of the Reichsarchiv…has
done much to confirm the value of its published
work. The reluctance to use inter-war German
histories on the grounds that they are tainted
by Nazism is not only chronological nonsense in
some cases (much was in print before 1933) but
also an absurd self-denying ordinance, given the
destruction of the bulk of the German military
archives in 1945. The Reichsarchiv historians
saw material we can never see; not to refer
to their output is a cloak for little more than
laziness or monolingualism.22

To address this gap in the historigraphy,
a project is currently underway to publish an
English-language translation of the German
Official History. This four-volume series in seven
parts, tentatively titled Germany’s Western Front:
Translations from the German Official History
of the Great War, edited by the authors of this
introduction, will aim to provide as complete a
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picture as possible of the German experience
on the Western Front with a special focus on the
operations in which Canadians participated.
The first volume, to be published in 2008,23
will cover the year 1915 when Canadians first
arrived on the Western Front. The series will
focus on the battlefield events of the divisions and
corps, but will also relate events at the highest
strategic and political levels. Supplementary
chapters, translated from other publications of
the Reichsarchiv, will enrich our understanding
of the tactical level battles in which Canadians
participated. While the purpose of the series is
to further our understanding of Canada’s Great
War with a “view from the other side,” the series
will also help to place the Canadian experience
within a larger context by examining the events
all along the Western Front that directly and
indirectly affected the British Expeditionary
Force, of which the Canadians were but a small
part. This project has been made possible by
funding from the Laurier Centre for Military
Strategic and Disarmament Studies at Wilfrid
Laurier University; a German-Canadian Studies
Research Grant from the Spletzer Family
Foundation (administered through the GermanCanadian Studies Foundation at the University
of Winnipeg); and additional support from Dr.
Jonathan Vance at the University of Western
Ontario.
What follows is a sample of the type of
material found in Der Weltkrieg. It is an
examination of the Second Battle of Ypres, first
published in 1931. Interesting for its discussion
of the reasons why the Germans used gas and
the aims and objectives of the attack, it helps to
contextualize our understanding of this important
battle. Viewed from the Allied perspective, the
German attack was a tactical failure because it
did not eliminate the Ypres salient, a point also
acknowledged in the conclusion of the German
account. However, the Germans viewed the battle
as a strategic success as it served to convince
Britain and France that Germany did have an
offensive capability on the Western Front.
Since the failure of the Schlieffen Plan at
the Marne in the fall of 1914, the German High
Command had fought internal battles over the
direction that the war should take. Falkenhayn
believed that the war could only be won if France
and Britain were defeated before attention was
shifted to Russia. However, the leaders of the

German army in the East – Hindenburg and
Luddendorff – disagreed and argued that all
available forces should be concentrated against
Russia. After much intrigue and debate, which
will be detailed further in the first volume
of translations, Falkenhayn gave into their
demands and the Western Front was stripped
of all but those troops required for its defence.
Not surprisingly, Falkenhayn was worried that
the Allies would discover the size of the shift in
the German forces and use it to their advantage.
Despite fighting the French to a standstill in the
Champagne in the first months of the year, the
German army still needed to convince the Allies
that its Western Front could not be breached
so that its full attention could be directed to
the Eastern Front. Gas, although unreliable,
provided the German army in the West with the
opportunity to punch above its weight. The fact
that reserves could barely be scraped together for
the attack demonstrated that the German army
was overstretched, but the mere fact that it was
able to launch an offensive that came so close to
breaking the Allied line hid its vulnerability from
the Allies. What the final outcome of the battle
ultimately meant is up to the reader to decide,
but this piece reminds us that history must be
evaluated from both sides and that one person’s
“fact” is another person’s interpretation.
59
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The German Supreme Army
Command and the Forces on the
Western Front in April 1915

D

uring the early months of 1915, the German
forces on the Western Front were involved
in heavy defensive engagements culminating in
the winter battle in the Champagne. Despite
the commitment of their strongest forces and
the bitter month-long fighting, the French did
not manage to break through the front lines of
the German Third Army. The British attempt
to overrun the German Sixth Army at Neuve
Chapelle also failed with heavy casualties, as
did a French encircling attack against St. Mihiel
salient.24 So with the troops encouraged by a sense
of superiority, and a regained sense of confidence
(despite their smaller numbers), in the middle
of April the German Western Front stood firm.
According to General von Falkenhayn,25 General
Headquarters – Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL)
– the conviction began to take hold,
that for the foreseeable future the enemy in
the West will not be able to force a decision
even if newly-formed German forces on the
Western Front would have to be committed to
the Eastern Front in order to break Russian
offensive power.26

This realization encouraged the OHL to decide on
13 April to temporarily forego the implementation

of the offensive plans on the Western Front in
favor of temporarily shifting the war’s center of
gravity to the Galician theatre of operations.27
*****

E

ven though major German offensive actions
in the West had to be discontinued, the OHL
was not ready to give the enemy the upper hand
by entirely limiting itself to defensive operations.
Lively activity in the front lines combined with
offensive raids “were intended to hide the troop
transfers to Galicia.”
Offensive operations were intended to
be launched in Flanders as well as by Army
Detachments Strantz and Gaede.28 Fourth Army
was finally to execute the long-planned gas
attack, the commencement of which especially
interested the Chief of the General Staff so as to
allow him to determine the effectiveness of this
new weapon.29

The Gas Attack by
the Fourth Army at Ypres

P

rior to the Great War, only the French planned
to utilize gas as a weapon. In their army, a
26 mm rifle grenade loaded with an ethyl bromoacetone filling, which had a suffocating effect, was

Courtesy of www.greatwardifferent.com

Crops at Ypres: British soldiers at Ypres in the Spring of 1915. Note the
rudimentary nature of the trenches and the crops which are visible in the ﬁelds.
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introduced as a weapon for attacking fortified
positions.30 At this time, however, Germany was
not prepared for combat in which gas would be
used as a weapon.

Courtesy of www.greatwardifferent.com

At the beginning of the war, foreign newspapers
repeatedly reported – incidentally without any
reproach – the use of new and sinister French
weapons, which were said to be fatal without any
external symptoms. The French chemist Turpin
was named as the inventor and in fact he did
offer such a weapon to the French Ministry of
War, but it was tried and found to be ineffective.
In the Prussian Ministry of War, similar proposals
submitted at the outbreak of the war were
ignored.31
Since the inception of static trench warfare
in 1914, the proximity of the opposing trenches
frequently impeded the firing of high explosive
shells since one’s own soldiers were naturally
put at risk by shrapnel. Beyond that, the tactical
situation meant that the potential of the explosive
could not effectively be brought to bear against
a deeply dug-in and entrenched enemy. At this
point the search for a more effective weapon
began. In the beginning of 1915, the French
leadership requested all available rifle gas
grenades for the front lines. On 21 February the
French Ministry of War issued a manual to the
armed forces regarding the utilization of the rifle
gas grenades and gas hand grenades, which had
in the meanwhile been introduced.32 The order
stated: “The fumes generated by these projectiles
are not fatal, at least if they are not inhaled in
excess.” Since the amount of the gas inhaled was
hardly up to the individual soldier involved, the
potential for a deadly effect was, without a doubt,
clear. By the end of February, numerous reports
from the Western Front regarding the deployment
of these weapons against German soldiers were
received.33
The German leadership had to consider the
possible deployment of chemical weapons by
the enemy and was not willing to be taken by
surprise. Initially the objective was merely to
use gas to drive the enemy from the protection of
their trenches into the effective range of artillery
fire.34 By the end of 1914, the development of
an artillery projectile (15 cm HE Shell 12T) had
been completed. In addition to its considerable
explosive capability, it also contained the gas
ingredient xylyl bromide which was similar in its

Courtesy of www.greatwardifferent.com
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General Erich von Falkenhayn, the Chief of the General
Staff of the Field Army and head of the OHL.

effectiveness, albeit less lethal, than the French
version. This so-called “T-Shell” was first used
on the Russian front in the beginning of 1915,
however, due to the intense cold, the results were
unsatisfactory.35 A pre-requisite for a success was
mass effectiveness. To achieve this with shells
carrying gas was initially out of the question
due to a lack of artillery pieces and suitable
propellants. Therefore the alternative of releasing
the gas where air currents were supposed to carry
it towards enemy positions became the most
viable option.
The existing conventions of international law
– The Hague Land Warfare Conventions of 29
July 1899 and 18 October 1907 and the Hague
Declaration of 29 July 1899 – did not anticipate
a war waged with gas.36 The Hague declaration
merely forbade the use of projectiles that had the
exclusive purpose of broadcasting suffocating and
poisonous gasses. Based on the declaration’s “all
participation clause,” the question as to whether
this declaration was still binding on all the
parties conducting the war after Turkey, as a nonsignatory of the agreement, became a party to the
war on 3 November 1914, remains debatable.37
Even if one assumes that the declaration
61
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Diagram of the installation of
German gas cylinders at Ypres.

Source: Rudolf Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg
(Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1927), translated
diagrams courtesy of the US Army War College,
Carlisle, PA.

affected by exposure to gas were almost
always totally rehabilitated without any
physically debilitating after-effects.38

remained binding among the signatories, the
utilization of projectiles like the German T-Shell,
which combined fragmentation with gas, was
in accordance with international law since the
dissemination of the gasses was not the “exclusive
objective” of the weapon. This is in contrast
with the French rifle grenade that had the single
objective of spreading poison gas. Therefore the
French rifle gas grenades represented the first
violation of the international laws governing the
waging of war with gas. The method of dispersing
gas into the air [without the use of a projectile]
was an invention of the German war industry and
did not contravene any existing conventions of
international law. Neither did the introduction of
a gas weapon violate the laws of humanity since
the percentage of casualties caused by shell fire
was, and remained, considerably higher than by
the use of gas in combat operations. Soldiers

Initially, chlorine gas was chosen
to be used for combat because its
production in sufficient amounts was
possible without impeding the munitions
industry in the homeland. The dispersion
of liquid chlorine from numerous steel
cylinders in the front trenches promised
to create a chlorine gas cloud which
would inundate the enemy positions
in a sufficient density, even despite
the loss of some of the gas to the air.
Additionally chlorine gas had the right
properties because it did not leave any
appreciable residue, thus enabling our
own forces to mount immediate attacks.
Chlorine also had less of an effect on the
human body than ethyl bromo-acetone
and chloracetone, the gases used by the
French. The creation of gas protection
equipment was developed parallel to the
production of this offensive weapon and
during 1915 a gas mask was successfully
developed for the German forces that
protected their faces and respiratory
systems.
In January 1915, the tests had progressed
to the point that General von Falkenhayn
decided to provide the Fourth Army with 6,000
large chlorine gas cylinders that were ready for
deployment. Another 24,000 smaller versions
were in the manufacturing pipeline. The OHL
ordered Fourth Army to deploy the new weapon
during an operation in the Ypres salient. It was
calculated that an average of one large or two
small cylinders were required per metre of front.
The technical supervision was in the hands of the
privy councillor, Professor Haber,39 who had been
entrusted with the management of the newlyformed chemical department of the Prussian
Ministry of War and the execution was assigned
to newly-formed pioneer units with especially
assigned meteorologists under the command
of Colonel Peterson.40 Considerable difficulties,

62

Humphries and Maker - Ypres 1915.indd 62

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol16/iss3/7

08/08/2007 5:50:33 PM

6

Humphries: The First Use of Poison Gase at Ypres, 1915

XXVI Reserve Corps, Lieutenant-General Baron
von Hügel46 emphasized that the success of his
Corps could only be expected if his flank was
protected by a simultaneous attack by the XXIII
Reserve Corps. Fourth Army’s Chief of Staff,
Brigadier Ilse, attempted to allay these concerns
by telephone but issued the following unequivocal
orders: “the commander-in-chief categorically
expects the XXIII Reserve Corps to advance with
XXVI Reserve Corps to reach Hill 20 near Pilkem
without fail.”

On the morning of 21 April, General von
Falkenheyn held a conference in Thielt with the
commanding officer of the Fourth Army, General
Albrecht Duke von Württemberg.41 At this meeting
he insisted on an early execution of the gas attack
in which the Fourth Army “should not aim for too
distant an objective, but rather execute the attack
at the first favorable opportunity.” Based on the
positive weather forecast, the operation was
ordered to begin at 0645 hours on the morning
of 22 April 1915.42

At 1800 hours, the gas cylinders installed
opposite the French 87th Territorial and 45th
Infantry Divisions were opened. The Belgian
General Staff had warned the French High
Command about the possibility of a German gas
attack a few days previously but apparently the
warning was disregarded. The wind blew from
the north at approximately two metres per second
and a solid white-yellow wall rolled towards the
enemy trenches. Even before it reached them, in
some areas the enemy was observed retreating
after firing a few rounds. Simultaneously, the
German trenches were hit with spirited enemy
artillery fire. At 1815 hours, immediately
following the gas cloud, the German infantry
began its attack.

Fourth Army tasked the XXIII and XXVI
Reserve Corps with the execution of the attack.
The available gas cylinders had been installed in
their positions north of Ypres from Steenstraate
to Poelcappelle. Except for units of the 43rd
Reserve Division, no larger forces were available
for exploiting a potential advantage.43 The XXIII
Reserve Corps was assigned the difficult objective
of fighting its way across the Yser Canal. The
primary objectives were as follows: for the
XXIII Reserve Corps a line from northwest
of Steenstraate through Lizerne to southwest
of Pilkem; for the XXVI Reserve Corps the
high ground along the Boesinghe–Pilkem–
Langemarck–Poelcappelle road. A further
objective of the attack was “the capture of the
Yser Canal, including Ypres.”44
Due to a lack of favorable winds on the
morning of 22 April, the attack had to be
postponed until the late afternoon. This caused
a severe problem since all preparations were
made for an attack at dawn. The commanding
general of the XXIII Reserve Corps, LieutenantGeneral von Kathen45 immediately expressed
his concern about mounting an attack in full
daylight, while the commanding general of the

Source: Lutz Knieling und Arnold Bolsche, Aus Deutschlands
grosser Zeit: Heldentaten deutscher Regimenter, Band 31:
Reserve Infantry Regiment 234 (Zeulenroda-Thür: Bernhard
Sporn, Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt, 193?).

however, remained to be resolved as commanding
officers as well as rank and file soldiers regarded
the untested weapon with distrust, if not with
complete disapproval. Even the OHL viewed the
gas weapon less than enthusiastically and refused
to deploy it during the impending breakoutoffensive in the Galician theater of operations
because it did not want to be dependent on the
timing of this apparently quite unreliable weapon.
The operation in the Ypres salient was therefore
intended to test its combat effectiveness.

General der Infanterie Baron von Hügel,
commanding general of XXVI Reserve Corps.
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Source: Rudolf Hanslian, Der Chemische
Krieg (Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1927),
translated diagrams courtesy of the US
Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
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In the area of the XXIII Reserve Corps, in
front of Steenstraate, the release of the gas was
not entirely successful. As a result, the left wing
of the 45th Reserve Division commanded by
Major-General (Generalleutnant) Schöpflin was
only able to advance slowly under strong enemy
defensive fire. It was very late in the day when
the village of Steenstraate was taken with heavy
casualties by units of the 45th and 46th Reserve
Divisions. A continuation of the attack in the
direction of Lizerne was beyond the capabilities
of the already exhausted units. The main body of
the 46th Reserve Division, commanded by MajorGeneral Hahn quickly advanced to the canal
near and north of Het Sas, traversed it and took
the western bank, while across from Boesinghe,
they were only able to reach the canal in a few
places.
In front of the right wing of the XXVI Reserve
Corps, the psychological impact was massive.
The assault units of the 52nd Reserve Division
commanded by Major-General Waldorf proceeded
without resistance and reached their objective,
the hills near Pilkem, at 1840 hours. There they
were halted since the neighbouring divisions
had fallen behind. The advance of the 51st
Reserve Division to the east was considerably
more difficult. The gas in front of their lines
near and east of Langemarck was either not
effective or the units did not attack immediately.
Therefore the extreme right wing of the French
and the Canadians adjacent to the east were
able to offer a stubborn resistance and it was
not until 1900 hours that Langemarck – which
had been the scene of heavy and bloody fighting
in earlier battles – was in German hands. The
commanding officer of the 51st Reserve Division,
Brigadier (Generalmajor) Friedrich von Kleist,
then received orders to take the bridges across
the Haanebeek Creek south of Langemarck as
well as St. Julien on the same day if possible.
64
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The 37th Landwehr Brigade, which was in
immediate reserve, was made available by the
order of corps headquarters to the successful
52nd Reserve Division and was brought forward
to Pilkem. Around 1945 hours this division
reported its attack on the heights south of Pilkem.
In front of its advance, the artillery and reserves
of the enemy were apparently swept back in a
panicky retreat. In contrast to this, the enemy
had moved reinforcements to St. Julien against
the 51st Reserve Division thus impeding its
advance. Aerial reconnaissance revealed train
movements on the tracks between Hazebrouck
and Poperinghe which led to the assumption that
the enemy was moving additional reinforcements
into the zone of operations. Consequently, the
102nd Reserve Infantry Brigade, which had
been held back in the Houthulster Forest, was
moved up to Koekuit at this late hour. Around
2130 hours, the 51st Reserve Division reported
taking both bridges across Haanebeek Creek
southwest of Langemarck while there was still
fighting for the other bridge to the south. Both
Divisions were ordered to hold their positions
and to continue the attack on the next day with
the 37th Landwehr Brigade ordered to establish
a supporting position on the heights near Pilkem.
The commander of the heavy artillery was
instructed to advance and reposition his batteries
during the night to be in a position to bring the
enemy on the west side of the canal and in city
of Ypres into range of the artillery.
In summary, on 22 April the XXIII Reserve
Corps had thrown the enemy across the canal
between Steenstraate and Het Sas and the XXVI
Reserve Corps had penetrated to a line from
south of Pilkem to northwest of St. Julien.
The captured enemy forces amounted to 1,800
unwounded French and 10 British47 soldiers and
captured materiel consisted of 51 artillery pieces
– including four heavy guns – and approximately
70 machine guns.
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Source: Rudolf Hanslian, Der Chemische
Krieg (Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1927),
translated diagrams courtesy of the US
Army War College, Carlisle, PA.
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By the evening of 22 April, the enemy had
suffered a wide breach between the canal
and St. Julien. Only weak French forces
remained southeast of Boesinghe and, mixed
with Canadians, north of Keerselaere. The breach
was only barely secured by British forces and
a cohesive line no longer existed. Movements
of reinforcements and supplies were severely
hampered by heavy German artillery fire aimed
at the canal crossings near Ypres. Consequently,
the position of the enemy in the Ypres salient had
become seriously threatened.

During the night of 22-23 April, the left wing
of the 45th Reserve Division, in the sector of the
XXIII Reserve Corps was repeatedly attacked in
Lizerne. Although the German forces were able to
repel these attacks, as a result they were unable
to launch their assigned combat missions with
any sustainable energy. Consequently the 45th
Reserve Division was only able to reach the sector
Source: Rudolf Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg (Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1927),
translated diagrams courtesy of the US Army War College, Carlisle, PA.

Encouraged by the successes of the first day
of combat, Fourth Army’s commander believed he
was justified in expanding the original objectives
which had only extended to the Yser Canal and
therefore issued orders on the morning of 23
April to continue the attack in the “direction of
Poperinghe.” The XXIII Reserve Corps was given
a line from Pypegaele–Gegend to southwest of
Boesinghe as its next objective. The XXVI Reserve

Corps was ordered to continue the advance in a
southerly direction, with its right wing along the
canal, in order to attack the enemy positioned
in front of the XXVII Reserve Corps from the
rear. To accomplish this mission the Army
Reserve (elements of the 43rd Reserve Division)
commanded by Brigadier von Runckel was
assigned to the XXIII Reserve Corps. The 86th
Reserve Brigade was immediately engaged and
replaced a brigade of the 45th Reserve Division,
freeing that division for other combat missions.
Additionally two regiments of the Marine Corps
were moved into the area of Staden–Houthulst.
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Source: Lutz Knieling und Arnold Bolsche, Aus Deutschlands grosser Zeit: Heldentaten
deutscher Regimenter, Band 31: Reserve Infantry Regiment 234 (Zeulenroda-Thür:
Bernhard Sporn, Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt, 193?).
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Above left: German soldiers with rudimentary gas mask; Top right: Supply dump behind the front lines of Reserve
Infantry Regiment (RIR) 234; Bottom right: The front line trenches of RIR 234 at Ypres.

of the Yperlée Creek west of Steenstraate on
23 April. The enemy had established defensive
positions in front of the 46th Reserve Division
along the Lizerne–Boesinghe road by adding
reinforcements. Therefore the attack of this
division met with limited success as well.
Initially on 23 April, the forces of the XXVI
Reserve Corps had only to deal with British
counterattacks. In order to support the advance
of the 51st Reserve Division as early as 0845
hours, General Baron von Hügel ordered the
commander of the gas units to install all available
gas cylinders in the sector of this division.
From the order to attack issued at noon, the
Commanding General of the XXVI Reserve Corps
assumed that Army Headquarters:
considered the operation against Poperinghe
to be the main undertaking and the advance
of the XXVI Reserve Corps to be of secondary
importance. Since sufficient forces for advancing
on Poperinghe across the canal were not available,
the success of this venture was in question from
the outset. The advance of the army corps on the
right wing along the channel was also impossible,
as long as the neighbouring corps had not taken
Boesinghe and would be further advancing on

Poperinghe. This was thought to be the only way
to remove the strong enemy artillery unit on the
opposite side of the canal.

According to reports received by the
XXVI Reserve Corps, the enemy had dug in
approximately 500 metres in front of the German
lines; reinforcements had also been brought in
from Ypres. Around 1830 hours, English and
French forces initiated a counterattack along
both sides of the Ypres–Pilkem road with French
forces striking across the bridges near Boesinghe.
Although the enemy attack was repulsed, the
forward movement of the XXVI Reserve Corps
had been stopped. On 24 April, the 52nd Reserve
Division was ordered to hold in the positions they
had gained. Following a gas attack early on 24
April, the 51st Reserve Division with the 102nd
Reserve Infantry Brigade, was ordered to take
the ridge north of Wieltje and Frezenberg.
In the meantime 48 the OHL intervened
and informed Fourth Army Headquarters
“that Poperinghe was not even considered an
operational objective at this time, rather that at
the present the closing of the Ypres salient could
be the only concern.”49
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On the morning of 24 April elements of the
45th and 46th Reserve Divisions stormed the
strongly-contested village of Lizerne. After heavy
fighting with heavy losses that lasted late into the
night, the left wing of the 46th Reserve Division
managed to take the eastern bank of the canal
opposite Boesinghe.
At 0500 hours gas was released north of St.
Julien in the sector of the XXVI Reserve Corps
and the 101st and 102nd Reserve Infantry
Brigades immediately attacked behind the thinly
developing cloud. After heavy fighting their attack
slowly advanced during the morning, at first west
of Keerselaere and later to the east of it as well.
The fate of this village, that was defended by the
enemy with tenacious determination, was not
decided until mid-day. South of Keersslaere, in
the farms and hedgerows of St. Julien, the enemy
continued to resist. In the afternoon, Fourth
Army Headquarters assigned both regiments

of the Naval Corps to the XXVI Reserve Corps
and as a result General Baron von Hügel again
ordered a penetration west of St. Julien at 1445
hours. The regiments of the 51st Reserve Division
did not reach St. Julien until 1900 hours after
heavy fighting and had to again vacate the village
soon afterwards as a result of attacking British
battalions. In the sector of the neighbouring
52nd Reserve Division, the day generally passed
quietly. For 25 April, General Baron von Hügel
planned the continuation of the ordered attack.
The deployment was planned for 0515 hours.
This time Colonel Peterson had been ordered
to install gas cylinders in the sector of the 52nd
Reserve Division east from the Ypres–Pilkem
Road to the woods west of St. Julien.
On 24 April, the XXVI Reserve Corps and the
right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps stepped
into the attack. The following plan was agreed
upon: at the beginning of the day a combined

map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2007

Source: Lutz Knieling und Arnold Bolsche, Aus Deutschlands grosser Zeit: Heldentaten
deutscher Regimenter, Band 31: Reserve Infantry Regiment 234 (Zeulenroda-Thür:
Bernhard Sporn, Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt, 193?).
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brigade50 of the 53rd (Saxon) Reserve Division
commanded by Brigadier von Schmieden
deployed behind the left wing of the 51st Reserve
Division was to join the attack, execute a turn and
roll the enemy up from the northwest in front of
the 38th Landwehr and 106th Reserve Infantry
Brigades. During the execution of this attack,
advancing from Poelcappelle, Brigade Schmieden
faced a fresh enemy and therefore had to mount
a frontal attack. It was not until this obstacle had
been removed that the turn to the southeast could
be executed. On the evening of 24 April, the right
wing of the brigade had fought to a standstill on
the hills northwest of Gravenstafel.
West of the canal, the artillery bombardment
against the forces of the XXIII Reserve Corps
had, on 25 April, increased to the point where a
successful continuation of the attack was out of
the question.
Early on 25 April the XXVI Reserve Corps
regained possession of St. Julien which had
been vacated by the enemy. The 51st Reserve
Division had orders to reach the objectives
established on 24 April: the ridge north of Wieltje
and Frezenberg. The neighbouring 52nd Reserve
Division was to enter the battle in a supporting
role. At 0700 hours, seven British battalions
launched a surprise attack southwest of St.
Julien against the German forces that had been
deployed for the attack. The incredibly forceful
enemy attack that came in waves could not be
entirely repulsed until 0800 hours. With that,
the combat capabilities of the German forces
had deteriorated; only the regiments on the left
wing of the 51st Reserve Division gained minimal
ground east of St. Julien in tenacious fighting
later on.
On the right wing of the XXVII Reserve
Corps, in the advancing darkness, the FortuinMosselmarkt road was reached and approximately
1,000 Canadians were taken prisoner. However,
with the aid of reinforcements south of the road,
the enemy, who had previously been driven back,
continued their resistance.
The intentions of the Commanding General
of the Fourth Army became clear with the orders
issued in the afternoon of 25 April following a
conference with the Commanding General of
the XXIII Reserve Corps. General von Kathen

emphasized the necessity to continue the attack
in order to take Boesinghe. The Fourth Army
Commander opposed this plan arguing:
The outcome of this attack is doubtful. It would
take great sacrifices and it would be difficult to
hold that much ground on the western bank.
The Corps should be satisfied with its [present]
accomplishment … The Fourth Army’s objective
is primarily to close the salient east of Ypres
with the attack by the XXVI Reserve Corps.
Only then could an advance past Boesinghe be
considered.

On the afternoon of the 26th, a number of
strong French attacks were directed against
the area of Steestraate and Het Sas. They were
conducted by territorial forces and elements of
the recently activated 153rd Infantry Division
supported by effective British and Belgian artillery
support. The 46th Reserve Division thus found
itself in a precarious situation and the enemy
took the position west of Het Sas, although the
locks on the canal could be held. In the meantime
Lizerne was also attacked at 1800 hours from a
northerly direction and was taken by the enemy.
The Germans occupied the old French trench
east of the town but due to heavy enemy fire, a
planned counterattack did not materialize.
Reports received by the XXVI Reserve Corps
during the course of the morning revealed that
the enemy had assembled two fresh Corps in
the area east of Ypres and was clearly planning a
counterattack which was initiated with aggressive
artillery support. Shortly after noon strong enemy
forces – part of the British 28th as well as the
4th, and 50th Territorial and Lahore Divisions
– attacked from the Canal to St. Julien but every
attempt failed due to the unswerving stand of the
German infantry.
As at St. Julien, the enemy counterattacks on
26 April in the area of Gravenstafel prevented a
further advance by the XXVII Reserve Corps.
During the following days, enemy attempts
to push the badly-mauled regiments of the 46th
Reserve Division (part of the XXIII Reserve Corps)
back to the eastern bank of the canal failed as
again the waves of the attack broke against the
German lines. The division was able, however,
to hold the new positions on the Yperlée Creek
with the support of the 45th Reserve Division.
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In the meantime the British
Commander in Chief, Field
Marshal Sir John French, began
to doubt the advisability of holding
the threatened Ypres salient. As
early as 27 April, he had ordered
the local commander to initiate
preparations for a withdrawal
to a rearward position in the
area east of Ypres. In response
to emphatic protestations by
General Foch, and despite the
development of the precarious
military situation, the execution of
this plan was postponed. A British
signal intercepted on the evening
of April 29 carried the following
message: “The situation of our
forces, British as well as French,
in Ypres is critical. We must be
prepared for bad news.” Fourth
Army Headquarters saw this
as a confirmation of its opinion
that the enemy considered the
salient east of Ypres to be more
and more difficult to hold and,
with a continuation of pressure,
an evacuation in the near future
could be expected.

Source: Lutz Knieling und Arnold Bolsche, Aus Deutschlands grosser Zeit: Heldentaten deutscher Regimenter, Band 31: Reserve
Infantry Regiment 234 (Zeulenroda-Thür: Bernhard Sporn, Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt, 193?).

The XXVI Reserve Corps
Headquarters abandoned the
continuation of the attack since
the number of installed gas
cylinders was considered to be
insufficient and, in view of the
well entrenched enemy, and the
weakness of the German artillery,
an attack without the support of
gas was considered to be almost
hopeless. Therefore, a further
advance by the strong right wing
of the XXVII Reserve Corps with
the objective of breaking through
to Gravenstafel from the north
was delayed.

The ruined village of Langemark (Top) and St. Julien (Middle) as photographed
by soldiers of RIR 234; Bottom: Captured English (possibly Canadian) trenches
at Ypres.

On 2 May, combat units designated by Fourth
Army and supported by gas, renewed the attack
north of Ypres.
Shortly after 1800 hours both divisions of
the XXVI Reserve Corps reported the opening
of the gas cylinders installed between Pilkem

and St. Julien. The effect on the enemy was
lessened as the transmission of commands was
badly hampered by destroyed telephone lines,
which prevented a coordinated simultaneous
release of the gas. The density of the gas was
also diminished by gusting winds and the effect
on an enemy equipped with simple protection
devices was negligible and the attackers met
insurmountable resistance.
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On 3 May, the 51st Division, which was
to transfer the weight of the attack to the left
wing, was reinforced by a marine infantry
regiment. Aided by the terrain which featured
numerous individual farms, the enemy resisted
tenaciously.
On the right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps,
however, the 38th Landwehr Brigade managed on
2 May to gain some ground on the Mosselmarkt–
Fortuin road. The 105th Reserve Infantry Brigade
(Schmieden) adjoining in the east was stalled in
front of a ferociously defended trench network in
a forest north of Gravenstafel. Considering these
small and unimportant gains, which had resulted
in high casualties, the Commanding General,
Lieutenant-General (General der Artillerie) von
Schubert, proposed to Fourth Army that they
abandon the costly preliminaries at Zonnebeke
and put the available forces that would result – at
least a division – in the vicinity of Keerselaere at
the disposition of the General Officer commanding
Fourth Army in order to support a decisive attack
by XXVI Reserve Corps on Ypres. Fourth Army,
however, did not accept this proposal. Therefore
on 3 May, the 105th Reserve Infantry Brigade
had to continue attacking the trench network
occupied by the enemy. This attack, which was
executed with determination, was crowned with
total success.
Under the pressure of these attacks, on the
night of 3-4 May, the British forces evacuated
their positions from Fortuin to southwest of
Gheluvelt. XXVI Reserve Corps Headquarters
immediately ordered the 51st Division to attack.
Despite continuous fighting against stubborn
resistance, only a line from Vanheule Farm to the
Haanebeek Creek was reached.
The XXVII Reserve Corps and the XV Corps
on the left in the southern part of the Ypres
salient, however, did not initially meet any
resistance. General von Schubert deployed the
right wing of the 53rd Reserve Division in the
direction of Frezenberg and the left wing of the
54th (Württemberg) in the direction of Eksterneft.
The XV Corps reported that the right wing of the
39th Infantry Division was also in the process of
advancing on Eksterneft. Around 1600 hours,
the divisions were again facing strongly-fortified
enemy positions in the area to the northeast of
Wieltje and Frezenberg and to the east of Hooge,

which necessitated a carefully planned attack;
this was ordered on the afternoon of 6 May.
Motivated by the urgent desire to push the
enemy across the Yser Canal as soon as possible,
Fourth Army intended to continue the attack
with an encircling movement from three sides.
With this in mind, XXVI Reserve Corps was
supposed to advance in a southerly direction in
order to take the hills around Wieltje, XXVII was
to attack the high ground facing it to the west
and XV Corps was to push the enemy back in
a northwesterly direction between Bellewaarde
Lake and Zillebeke Lake. The commencement of
the artillery barrage was set for 0800 hours on 8
May.
The main burden for the attacks was born
by the XXVII Reserve Corps. At 1030 hours on
8 May, after a three-hour artillery preparation,
the regiments advanced under favorable weather
conditions against the British 27th and 28th
Infantry Divisions but found the forward trenches
deserted. After coming under strong enemy
artillery fire, the advance over open ground
soon ground to a halt. As night fell, at least
the commanding ridge west of Frezenberg and
Eksterneft was in German hands.
Around 1440 hours on the next day, XXVIII
Reserve Corps Headquarters received the
following message from Fourth Army:
His Royal Majesty informs that according to
an intercepted British order to retreat,51 all
indications are that the British have abandoned
all resistance on the eastern bank of the Yser. At
the present time the Sixth Army is under attack
by strong British forces. All indications are that
the British are assembling all available forces in
front of the Sixth Army.

As the result, General von Schubert ordered
a new artillery preparation from 1530 hours
to 1700 hours, which assisted the attacking
forces in making small gains in terrain up to the
Verlorenhoek–Bellewaarde Lake. The objective
“to push the enemy into his final position near
Potijze” was not accomplished despite the
sacrificial valor of the attacking regiments.
On 9 May, parts of the XXII Reserve Corps
joined the battle along the coast, but in connection
with the XXVI Reserve Corps and the right wing of
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the XV Corps, were able only to make insignificant
gains. Their attacks failed too because of the
strong resistance in the enemy trenches
*****

B

y 9 May, the fighting around Ypres was
generally over. The entire attack up to then
had cost the Germans more than 35,000 men
while the British lost 59,275 men between 22 April
and 31 May; according to their own calculations,
the French losses were extremely high. On 22
April alone they lost 18,000 soldiers.
Despite the new gas weapon, the success of
the action at Ypres did not extend past the initial
gains and the objective of closing the Ypres salient
was not accomplished. The primary reasons for
this are that on 22 April the surprise of the enemy
could not be sufficiently exploited due to the
approaching darkness. Although in early May the
enemy had retreated to the prepared positions
between Wieltje and Little Zillebeke, in spite
of pressure from heavy losses, they repeatedly
attacked the forces of the XXVI and XXVII Reserve
Corps. The initial successes north of Ypres were,
however, mostly due to the employment of gas,
which demonstrated to the command and rank
and file its usefulness as a new weapon,52 despite
its intrinsic shortcomings.
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if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.”
These assertions about the legality of the use of gas
were based on very literal readings of the conventions
governing land warfare and, while technically correct,
it could be easily argued that both German (as well as
French) actions violated the spirit, if not the letter of the
law.
Fritz Haber (1868-1934), who would win the Nobel Prize
for his synthesis of artificial ammonia in 1918, was
director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical and
Electro Chemistry in Berlin.
Colonel Otto Peterson (later a brigadier) commanded a
unit known after the Second Battle of Ypres as Pioneer
Regiment 35. Made up of civilian scientists, chemical
experts and soldiers, this and similar units were
responsible for conducting the German army’s chemical
war. Turmpener, pp.471-2.
General Albrecht Duke von Württemberg (1865-1939)
had commanded the Fourth Army during the battles of
the frontiers, the first battle of the Marne and at Ypres
in 1914.
The gas attack had been planned since the beginning
of March and on 10 April, Falkenhayn, and the Chief
of Staff of the Fourth Army, Brigadier Ilse, had again
scheduled the attack for 15 April in anticipation of more
favourable weather. However, on the morning of the 15th,
the winds remained calm and the attack again had to be
postponed. See Der Weltkrieg, Vol.7, p.64.
In the spring of 1915 the German Army was significantly
overstretched on the Western Front, mainly because any
expendable troops had been transferred to the East,
and as a result few reserves were available to exploit
successes. Indeed, Falkenhayn wanted to “get the gas
attack out of the way at the earliest opportunity” as he
“planned to extract the XXIII and XXVI Reserve Corps
as well as the 4th Ersatz Division” from the area around
Ypres for deployment elsewhere. See Der Weltkrieg,
Vol.7, p.64. A footnote from the original text reads:
“Lieutenant General Ilse provided the Reichsarchiv
with a report dated 16 November 1931 as follows: ‘The
High Command of the Fourth Army had requested
the availability of a division to provide the capability
of taking advantage of the potential success of the gas
attack with a strong follow-up attack in order to roll up
the Ypres Salient. General von Falkenhayn turned this
request down because he did not have sufficient forces
at his disposal in the spring of 1915 and also because
he doubted the success of the gas attack. Another
contributing factor for his refusal of the request for the
disposition of a division was the concern that many
weeks could pass before the gas attack would become
a reality. Von Falkenhayn could not and would not
release a division for that period of time.’ The files of the
Reicharchiv do not contain this information. It appears
that the request and refusal were verbal.”
The Army orders of 8 April and 14 April identified the
mission of XXIII and XXVI Reserve Corps as “the capture
of the elevations north of Pilkem and the adjoining areas
to the East.” It was expected “that the enemy would
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find it to be impossible to stay in the salient around
Ypres. Additionally the offensive had the mission to
take the Yser Canal up to and including Ypres.” See Der
Weltkrieg, 1914 bis 1918, volume 7, p.64.
Lieutenant-General Hugo von Kathen (1855-1932), an
infantry officer, was military governor of the Fortress of
Mainz from the outbreak of war until December 1914
when he assumed command of the XXIII Reserve Corps,
a position he held until the end of July 1918 when he
took command of Eighth Army.
Lieutenant-General Otto Freiherr von Hügel (1853-1928),
an infantry officer, was commanding officer of XXVI
Reserve Corps from August 1914 to March 1918 when
he was “sent on leave.”
The word “British” is used in the original but this could
easily refer to Canadian soldiers.
A footnote in the original reads: “This was probably
ordered by telephone on 23 April and afterwards
confirmed in writing.”
A footnote in the original reads: “In this regard General
Ilse stated in his comments dated 16 November 1931
addressed to the Reichsarchiv: ‘This message was…
correctly received. However the OHL was mistaken and
has admitted this error because 4th Army Headquarters
did not establish Poperinghe as the operational
objective but explicitly mentioned attacking in the
direction of Poperinghe, the village located on the road
running straight in a westerly direction from Ypres. As
mentioned, this was meant to merely indicate the general
direction of the attack by the XXIII Reserve Corps…’”
Subsequently referred to as Brigade Schmieden.
A footnote in the original reads: “As far as can be
determined, no order to retreat had been issued. It is a
fact that orders in the case of a retreat and evacuation
of the positions east of Ypres were issued by the local
Commander, General Plumer on April 29 and May 1. See
the British Official History, Volume III, pp.404-10.”
A footnote in the original reads: “In his memorandum
to the Reichsarchiv dated 30 August 1931, General von
Schubert emphasized that the use of gas during the Ypres
operation was only effective one time and that was on 22
April north of Pilkem. The flaw in the use of the gas was
mostly caused by the differences in the terrain and that
consequently on an extended front it was impossible to
achieve uniform results. Additionally, the usefulness of
the gas was limited since the timing of the release could
never really be maintained.”
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A- JS -007-003/JD -001
Customs and Traditions of the
Canadian Military Engineers
para 56, page 7-19 states:

Dear sir,

T

he analysis of death sentences
and commutations
i n “A r b i t r a r y J u s t i c e ? :
A Comparative Analysis of
Canadian Death Sentences
Passed and Commuted during
the First World War” by Teresa
Iacobelli (Winter 2007) has been
long overdue.
Though the sample
investigated was biased, because
all instances were Canadian, it
seems quite likely that a wider
probe would reveal similar
inconsistencies attributable
to the timing of operations
(planned or in process) and
to concerns about the state of
individual battalions.
A fundamental question
here is why, given the Australian
experience, the British and
Canadians persisted in their
belief that the application of
the death penalty improved
the discipline of their troops
and the performance of their
battalions.
Whatever his military
shortcomings might have been,
no Australian soldier was
executed during World War I.
Yet the Australian divisions
were consistently among the
best-performing divisions on the
Western Front.
J.F. Doig
Wolfville, NS
ps. Was the sketch accompanying
the article correctly titled? It
looks more like an interrogation
by a “bad cop,” prior to turning
the prisoner over to a “good
cop” who will offer him a seat, a

cigarette and a bit of sympathetic
conversation. [Eds. note: the
caption was the origin written
by the artist.]

*****
Dear Sir,

I

have just started reading
through Spring 2007 issue of
CMH and as always I completely
enjoy the magazine contents.
While reading “Fighting Time:
Gregg Centre and Royal
Canadian Engineers Join Forces
to Record New Brunswick’s
Past,” by Lee Windsor and Lee
Ellen Pottie, I was a more than
a bit shocked to find that the
Royal Canadian Engineers are
being credited with helping you
clear the Red Head site. Guys, I
hate to tell you this, but the RCE
has not existed since 1968!

In reaction to the public’s rising
criticism of the peacetime defence
budget, the Federal Liberal Party
promised in the 1963 election a
full review of Canadian defence
policy. In 1964 the Bill C-90
passed Parliament integrating
the three services’ headquarters
and other activities such as
recruiting and basic training.
The unification of the services
into a single force was presented
to Parliament in Bill C-243 in
December 1966. On 2 February
1968, the three traditional
services of Canada’s fighting force
passed into history to be replaced
by a single unified service, “The
Canadian Forces.” The Corps of
Royal Canadian Engineers, the
RCAF Construction Engineering
Branch and the RCN Civil
Engineering Branch also ceased
to exist at that date. A review
of the engineering tasks facing
the Canadian Forces (CF) led
to the merging of the combat
engineering, construction
engineering, survey, and fire
protection into oneorganization.
It was named the Canadian
Military Engineer (CME) Branch
and officially designated as such
on 1 April 1968.

Such was the case with all of
the army Corps who during the
same period became Branches. I
hope this information clears up
an apparent confusion over the
correct name of the Engineers
and that credit will be given to
the CME for helping you with
your project.
WO Storey, CD
Mapping and Charting
Establishment
Canadian Military Engineers
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